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Ensuring Respect: United Nations Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law
Peter F. Chapman*

n an effort to stem violent conflict, the United Nations has
increasingly turned to peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations.1 While these forces have had success in mitigating conflict, their efforts have also been tainted by allegations
of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). To date,
the UN has not developed a comprehensive mechanism to
investigate and punish such violations. In order to comply with
IHL and to uphold the UN’s mission of promoting international
cooperation, the UN must establish a clear framework to enforce
the law of war within its own peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces.
This article will begin with an introduction to UN peace
operations, highlighting some cases of alleged abuse. The second section will examine the applicability of IHL to the UN.
First, the section will examine the nuances of IHL by describing
the differences between international, non-international, and
internationalized armed conflict. It will then demonstrate that
the UN is bound by IHL. The article will conclude by examining
several potential mechanisms to enforce the UN’s obligations
under IHL: international state responsibility; domestic proceedings in the troop-contributing state; human rights mechanisms;
claims commissions; the International Criminal Court (ICC);
and ombudspersons. Finally, the article will offer brief recommendations for how the UN can ensure its compliance with IHL
while adequately supporting victims’ needs.

By Scott Chacon.

I

Introduction

UN peacekeepers in Kigali, Rwanda.

Chapter VI-authorized actions based on the consent of the belligerent parties.4
Alternatively, UN peace enforcement operations are those
actions which constitute a “forcible military intervention[] by
one or more states into a third country with the express objective
of maintaining or restoring . . . peace and security by ending a
violent conflict within that country.”5 These forces, authorized
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are characterized by their
explicit authorization to use force in defense of the mandate
— typically to establish peace and order.6 While academically
these two different types of operations may seem separate and
distinct, on the ground, UN operations rarely neatly fit into a
single category.
The UN operation in Somalia demonstrates how easily
operational mandates may shift. In early 1992, Somalia’s
civil war had caused a humanitarian crisis.7 The UN Security
Council responded by first authorizing the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) “to monitor the cease-fire in
Mogadishu”8 and protect deliveries of humanitarian aid within
Mogadishu. The Security Council later expanded the force’s
mandate to all of Somalia.9 In December of the same year, the
Security Council issued a resolution, this time under Chapter
VII, changing the force’s mandate yet again and authorizing the
UN “and Member States . . . to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations in Somalia.”10 Pursuant to Resolution 794,
the UN created an offensive force named Unified Task Force
(UNITAF), which delegated much of the authority for enforcing
the peace to the U.S. Central Command as well as forces from
other states.11 In 1993, the Security Council further expanded
the UNOSOM mandate by creating UNOSOM II, which
authorized the force to (1) prevent the resumption of violence,
(2) seize small arms from “all unauthorized armed elements,”

An Overview of UN Peace Operations
Numerous terms have been used to describe “peacekeeping
forces” including traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, and peace support operations (PSOs). The
UN itself uses terminology that differentiates between offensive
and defensive peacekeeping forces. A UN panel, convened in
2000 by the Secretary-General to examine peace operations in
the United Nations context, used the term “peace operations” as
an umbrella term covering “conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building.”2 These forces, authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, are characterized by
impartiality in the conflict.3 This paper will use the term PSO
popularized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and scholars such as Marten Zwanenburg, legal counsel at
the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands, to describe those
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(3) “[protect] ‘as required’ of UN, [ICRC], and NGO personnel,
installations and equipment,” and (4) “control of heavy weapons.”12 Such modification of the mandates had a legal effect on
the amount of force that could be authorized and, as such, modified the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Both UN PSOs and enforcement operations have been
subject to allegations of human rights and humanitarian law
violations. For example, the UN forces in Somalia were alleged
to have committed violations of IHL, including torture and the
targeting of civilians.13 The current UN force in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), established in 1999 under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,14 has been plagued by allegations of sexual misconduct.15 Many other UN operations, including those in “Haiti, Mozambique, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo
and Cambodia,”16 also have been accused of abuses such as rape
or trafficking in persons.17
In the 1990s, after recognizing deficiencies in the regulation
of UN PSO and enforcement operations, the UN issued two
major reports aimed at reforming UN peace operations: The
Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations
Forces of International Humanitarian Law (the SecretaryGeneral’s Bulletin);18 and The Report of the Panel on UN Peace
Operations (the Brahimi Report).19 Notably, in outlining the
need for reform, the Brahimi Report specifically acknowledged
the “essential importance of the United Nations [in] promoting
. . . [IHL] in all aspects of its peace and security activities.”20
While the Brahimi Report suggests more than eighty ways for
the UN to reform their PSO and enforcement operations,21
rather than focusing on violations of IHL, most recommendations focus on clarifying administrative deficiencies, including
increased headquarters capacity, increased communication and
cooperation across the mission, and more rapid troop deployments.22
Neither the Secretary-General’s Bulletin nor the Brahimi
Report effectively clarify the scope of IHL’s applicability to UN
forces, how the UN can enforce its obligations under IHL, or
how best to ensure accountability. Indeed, the Brahimi Report
mentions accountability only twice — both times only in reference to procurement and spending.23 The Secretary-General’s
Bulletin argues that violations of IHL and “national law” are to
be handled by the sending-state’s domestic courts.24 However,
as this paper will demonstrate, domestic jurisdictions do not
adequately ensure compliance with the principles of IHL or
guarantee victims the right to redress.

Justice (ICJ) has also confirmed that the multiple branches of
IHL constitute a single body of law governing armed conflict.28

Basic Application of International Humanitarian Law
The application of IHL is not contingent on the moral or
ethical status of the parties to the conflict.29 IHL distinguishes
between the legality of the outbreak of conflict (jus ad bellum)
and the conduct of the hostilities (jus in bello),30 and binds all
parties to the conflict equally. UN authorization does not affect
the application of the law.31 Indeed, a party to a conflict cannot
use its status as a member of a collective security force or PSO
to justify breaches of IHL.32
IHL does, however, distinguish between international and
non-international armed conflict. IHL has traditionally regulated international armed conflict to a greater extent than noninternational armed conflict. In international armed conflict, at a
minimum, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and
other customary sources of IHL regulate the conduct of hostilities. Professor Dinstein aptly notes the importance of applying
customary international law to international armed conflict as
“no single treaty – and no cluster of treaties – purports to cover
the whole span of [international armed conflict].”33 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention also recalls the important
role of customary law in regulating armed conflict, declaring
“[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience.”34 Accordingly, in
instances of international armed conflict, parties are bound by
not only the text of relevant conventions, but also by customary
international law.
IHL also covers non-international armed conflict. To be
covered, non-international armed conflict must meet a certain
“minimum level of intensity,”35 and non-international disturbances, riots, and isolated or sporadic acts of violence are generally not regulated by IHL. Non-international armed conflict is, at
a minimum, regulated by Common Article Three to the Geneva
Conventions and customary international law. This corpus of
law creates fundamental standards for all non-international
armed conflict, which include the prohibition against torture
and the principles of proportionality, necessity, and distinction.
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions also governs
the conflict if the state has ratified that instrument,36 though the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary
International Law Study alleges that much of Additional Protocol
II has achieved the status of customary international law.37
IHL also regulates the conduct of hostilities in so-called
internationalized armed conflict. A conflict is internationalized
when a foreign state intervenes in a non-international armed
conflict. For example, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan created “an international armed conflict as between the United
States and Afghanistan,”38 but the conflict between Taliban and
the Northern Alliance fighters arguably remained regulated by
relevant rules of non-international armed conflict. The ICJ in the
Nicaragua case affirmatively recognized this hybrid application
of IHL. The ICJ detailed that a single conflict may be governed
by the regulations of both non-international armed conflict and
international armed conflict, depending on the status of the parties.39 Furthermore, the ICTY determined it had the authority to

Applicability of IHL to PSO
and Enforcement Operations
The application of IHL, which regulates the conduct of
hostilities, is triggered by armed conflict.25 The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined
armed conflict as the “resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups in a
State.”26 No formal declaration is required.
Several different sources of law make up the corpus of
modern IHL, including Hague law, Geneva law, and customary
international law. While historically some have highlighted the
different roles of each source of IHL, Yoram Dinstein, Professor
of International Law and President of the Tel Aviv University,
calls these distinctions “outdated.”27 The International Court of
3
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IHL is based on an objective test of the level of
violence, not the moral status of the parties; therefore,
the deployment of a PSO force does not subject it to
different regulations pertaining to the application of IHL.
When a PSO engages in activity that reaches the level
of armed conflict under IHL, the relevant provisions
of IHL will regulate its conduct.
a party to the conflict, as long as possible.”50 However, IHL is
based on an objective test of the level of violence, not the moral
status of the parties;51 therefore, the deployment of a PSO force
does not subject it to different regulations pertaining to the
application of IHL. When a PSO engages in activity that reaches
the level of armed conflict under IHL, the relevant provisions of
IHL will regulate its conduct.
Another manner in which UN-sponsored PSOs may be
bound by IHL is through the law of occupation. The Hague
Conventions and Geneva Conventions explicitly state that IHL
applies in cases of occupation,52 and some scholars suggest that
if the PSO is the “sole authority capable of exercising control
over the civilian population,” they will be an occupier under
international law.53 The law of occupation imposes numerous
privileges and duties upon the occupying force — including
adherence to IHL.

simultaneously adjudicate both interstate and intrastate conflict
in Bosnia.40

The Application of IHL to UN-Mandated Forces
The ICJ has ruled that the UN is “an international person,” which can be subject to international law,41 such as
IHL.42 A crucial factor in determining the applicability of
IHL on UN-mandated forces is determining whether the UN
is “the responsible entity for conduct of [the] operation.”43
UN-mandated forces are subject to UN control, and for the
purposes of the applicability of IHL, it can be said that the UN
is in the position to exercise command and control over the UN
PSO or enforcement force. Because the UN has control over
the forces, the organization is bound to comply with IHL provisions “in all circumstances by United Nations forces which
are engaged in hostilities.”44 The UN itself has recognized the
applicability of the humanitarian legal regime on UN forces,
with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin arguing that IHL applies
to UN “forces when in situations of armed conflict they are
actively engaged therein as combatants,” even if the combat is
in self defense.45
IHL, however, regulates UN PSOs and enforcement operations to different extents. The UN agrees that when PSOs are
“actively engaged” in combat, the provisions of IHL detailed
in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin are applicable “to the extent
and for the duration of their engagement.”46 However, the UN
has not clarified exactly what constitutes “actively engaged” in
combat or what applicable “to the extent and for the duration
of their engagement” means for the application of IHL.47 In
peace enforcement operations, IHL should apply “[f]rom the
moment a state takes action using military force on the territory
of another without the permission of the government of the latter, [and] armed conflict exists.”48 In instances where a Chapter
VI peacekeeping force regularly uses offensive military force, it
should be viewed as a de facto Chapter VII peace enforcement
operation.49
Marten Zwanenburg notes that in the past actors have only
found that a UN PSO is party to a conflict if high levels of
violence exist. This scope of application comes from a desire to
“consider an operation as impartial, and as a consequence not

What Humanitarian Law Applies to the UN?
The UN and other interested stakeholders must first determine what branch of IHL applies to UN forces — the law of
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict,
or a hybrid application. Different instruments regulate each
Member State of the UN, depending on the state’s accession to
different IHL instruments. Indeed, because the UN has not ratified any IHL instrument, the organization cannot clearly dictate
what law applies to its forces.54 While some Member States
may be subject to additional regulations, the UN itself likely
is subject only to those provisions of IHL that are classified as
customary law.
Determining what constitutes customary IHL is often difficult when applied to states;55 and its applicability to the UN is
even more perplexing. For example, while the ICRC alleges that
almost all of the Additional Protocols are customary law,56 the
United States contends that some elements of the Protocol have
not reached the status of customary law.57 Furthermore, under
international law, if a state persistently and constantly objects
to the creation of a customary norm, it will not bind that state.
Scholars have suggested that the United States, and potentially
France and Great Britain, likely qualify as persistent objectors to
some elements of Additional Protocol I.58 These ambiguities in
4
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the status of the law may create difficulties in application if, as in
the case of Somalia, the United States was participating in a UN
action with the military forces of other member states that might
have accepted the customary nature of Additional Protocol I.
Second, the UN must determine if PSO and enforcement
operations are classified as international or non-international
armed conflicts for the purposes of IHL. As elucidated by the
ICJ’s Nicaragua and Tadic decisions, international and noninternational armed conflicts may exist in the same battlefield
at the same time, depending on the status of the belligerents.
Accordingly, UN intervention in a non-international armed
conflict could internationalize that conflict as to the UN forces
while leaving the rules of non-international armed conflict to
apply among domestic forces. Therefore, any conflict between
the UN forces and domestic forces should be viewed as an international armed conflict as the UN constitutes an international
force.
After determining what branch of IHL applies to UN forces,
the organization must develop a mechanism to suppress such
violations.

UN tanks in Kismayo, Somalia during Operation CONTINUE HOPE
(1993).

vidually or in conjunction with a group of states, may raise the
issue of international responsibility under international law.
Such a doctrine of state responsibility is not sufficient to
implement the UN’s obligations under IHL. Injured states are the
only entities that may initiate claims. History shows that alleged
violations of IHL by PSOs and enforcement operations typically
occur in destabilized regions where the host government may not
have the capacity to bring a claim for the violation on behalf the
state.64 For example, in the case of Somalia, no central government existed that could pursue a claim under state responsibility
for alleged violations of IHL. The inability of victims to directly
claim a violation of the law of armed conflict by PSO or peace
enforcement operations may cause significant harm to victims
by denying them adequate redress while simultaneously ineffectively enforcing the IHL obligations of the force.65

Mechanisms to Suppress Violations of IHL
Entities regulated by IHL have an obligation to both educate
their forces in IHL in order to reduce collateral casualties59 and
to “devise and implement appropriate mechanisms to ensure
that the obligations imposed under [IHL] are respected.”60 There
are numerous ambiguities in the application and enforcement
of IHL in regards to United Nations forces. Therefore, the UN
should establish an effective and clear mechanism whereby
victims of alleged violations of IHL can seek redress. Such a
program is essential in establishing the rule of law and accountability in the post-conflict and conflict areas where PSO and
enforcement forces operate.
As the following sections will establish, victims of IHL
violations by a UN PSO or peace enforcement operation are
forced to choose from several different mechanisms that are
poorly suited to enforce their rights. Victims may claim the
international responsibility of the sending state or the individual under international law; may issue claims against the
individuals responsible for the alleged human rights violations;
or may potentially seek to bring claims directly against the UN,
as troop-sending states may lack the resources to compensate
victims. However, these current mechanisms are inefficient and
hard for victims to identify. This section will examine the limitations of existing mechanisms before suggesting alternatives in
order to elucidate how the UN can more effectively implement
its obligations under international law to ensure compliance with
IHL obligations.

Action in the Jurisdiction of the Sending State
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin,66 the International Law
Association, and legal experts all recommend that violations
of IHL be adjudicated in national courts.67 While such a forum
offers a familiar jurisdiction for adjudicating claims, it is insufficient for several reasons. First, such proceedings generally
cannot include the UN as it is generally “immune from legal
proceedings in local courts.”68 Because the majority of UN
forces come from countries still developing their economic and
legal institutions,69 it is unlikely that their domestic courts could
effectively handle the complicated allegations of abuse occurring a great distance from their courts or have access to funds
to compensate potential victims. Additionally, having such an
obligation would serve as a disincentive for troop-contributing
states to place their military under the jurisdiction of the UN.
Secondly, IHL has traditionally been seen as “governing
relations between states,” not between individuals and a state.70
While it is generally accepted that IHL may “confer[] rights on
individuals[,]” there are significant procedural hurdles for an
individual enforcing these rights in a state court of the alleged
abuser.71 Applicants have attempted to use Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Convention (IV) relating to compensation72 to sue for
alleged violations in domestic courts; however, most domestic
courts have ruled that Article 3 grants a right to compensation
only to a state, not to an individual.73

International State Responsibility
Marten Zwanenburg recalls that “all international rights
entail international responsibility.”61 The International Law
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which
examine the role of states in the international system,62 note that
the “conduct of a state organ does not lose that quality because
that conduct is, for example, coordinated by an international
organization, or is even authorized by it.”63 Ultimately, the
Commission adopted the principle that an injured state, indi-
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to be applied throughout the world.”85 This case demonstrates
the ineffectiveness of the Court as a forum for the adjudication
of claims of alleged IHL violations by PSO or enforcement
forces because violations must occur within territory governed
by the Convention to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court.86
Case law from the regional human rights bodies elucidates
that human rights courts likely do not serve as an effective
forum “to improve the implementation of IHL” among PSO
and enforcement operations.87 The Bankovic and Las Palmeras
cases, in particular, illustrate the difficulty of obtaining judgments against the perpetrators of violations of IHL in regional
human rights systems. Accordingly, such mechanisms do not
currently provide adequate enforcement mechanisms for violations of IHL by PSO or peace enforcement forces.
UN training operation in Mongolia for multinational forces.

Claims Commissions
Claims commissions may serve as a model for how the UN
can compensate victims for damage arising from UN operations; however, they do not serve as an effective enforcement
mechanism because they are not concerned with deterring
violations of IHL. There are several examples of claims commissions attempting to offer monetary redress for violations of
IHL including the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission88 and
the UN’s Civil Claims Unit.89 In 1991, the UN also established
a compensation commission for damages arising out of “Iraq’s
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”90 This tribunal
did not specifically adjudicate alleged violations of IHL, though
it did serve as a forum whereby host governments could submit
complaints on behalf of their on citizens for alleged violations.91
Such commissions may play a role in awarding compensation to
victims, but they do not address the UN’s obligations to ensure
its forces comply with IHL. If such a commission is to be used
to satisfy an alleged violation, it ought to be used in conjunction
with a different body that can effectively ensure compliance
with IHL.

Thirdly, domestic tort actions are “only available in
exceptional cases,” typically relying “on a domestic tort but
implicat[ing] an international violation.”74 These types of actions
have been unsuccessful due to procedural hurdles, such as the
requirement that victims initiate proceedings in person.75 These
obstacles “effectively discriminate[] against victims who cannot
afford to travel to the state in question”76 and create problems for
victims seeking to enforce their rights under IHL.
Finally, by relying on each troop-contributing state to enforce
the rights and obligations of IHL, the independence of the UN
may be minimized; indeed the “legitimacy[,]” impartiality, “and
effectiveness of the UN” may suffer.77 IHL could be ambiguously applied if domestic jurisdictions of states that have ratified
different instruments are responsible for adjudicating claimed
violations of those instruments.78

Human Rights Mechanisms
In recent years, some scholars and practitioners have suggested that regional human rights bodies might be an acceptable
jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations of IHL.79 While
human rights law allows victims to claim a breach of obligations by a state, most human rights bodies have been resistant
in applying IHL.80
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the
Las Palmeras case before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), argued that the Commission had the authority
to apply “the norms embodied in . . . customary [IHL] applicable
to internal armed conflicts and enshrined in Article 3, common
to all the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”81 The Colombian government asserted that the Commission exceeded its mandate and
that the IACtHR lacked the competency to apply IHL, because
it was not specifically provided for in its mandate.82 In response
to these conflicting arguments, the IACtHR overruled some of
the Commission’s analysis, and “refus[ed] to examine norms
falling outside the text of the []American Convention” such
as the customary nature of common Article 3.83 However, the
Court did not preclude the application of IHL norms in those
instances where the norms were also contained in the American
Convention.84
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Bankovic case,
limited the territorial applicability of the European Convention
on Human Rights, ruling that the Convention “was not designed

The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) serves as another
potential venue for the adjudication of alleged IHL violations.
However, the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute make it
highly unlikely that PSO or enforcement operations could fall
under the Court’s jurisdiction.92 Crimes against humanity require
widespread attacks directed against the civilian population as an
element of the crime.93 Genocide requires that the intent to
destroy “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”94 Such
definitions are beyond the scope of crimes alleged to have been
committed by the UN to date, and it seems unlikely that a UN
force could engage in such widespread violation of the law.
War crimes committed by PSO and enforcement operations,
however, arguably could fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC
should the attacks reach the gravity threshold and other requirements of the Rome Statute.95 However, Professor Harrington
of McGill University notes the difficulty of holding PSO or
enforcement operations accountable under the Rome Statute,
given that the Statute authorizes prosecution of individuals for
war “crimes which are part of a concerted effort or plan, rather
than those which are indiscriminately carried out for personal
gratification or other non-concerted reasons.”96 An examination
of media reports of previous allegations of peacekeeper abuse
6
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as both a PSO and transitional administration gave rise to the
creation of the ombudsperson.108 The ombudsperson in Kosovo
was tasked with “promot[ing] and protect[ing] the rights and
freedoms of individuals and legal entities and ensur[ing] that
all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise effectively [their]
human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”109 The “standard
of review” for the ombudsperson was “whether there has been
a violation of human rights and ‘abuse of authority’” by UN or
coalition forces.110
Marten Zwanenburg highlights that the ombudsperson in
Kosovo actually used IHL “as a standard of reference” in making
its recommendations.111 For example, the ombudsperson issued
a report on “[t]hird party claims for property loss or damage .
. . arising from or directly attributable” to the United Nations
forces.112 The report noted that IHL may be required to interpret
provisions of human rights law.113 The UNMIK ombudsperson
also “deliberately [left] open the possibility that [IHL]” could be
applicable to the United Nations forces in Kosovo.114
While the Kosovo ombudsperson marked a significant step
in the ability of the United Nations to effectively enforce its
obligations under IHL, “the [UN] Ombudsperson [in Kosovo]
lacked any power to do more than publicize his [or her] findings.”115 Publication of these findings, however, played a significant role in influencing UNMIK policy. For example, after
the ombudsperson reported unlawful detention procedures in
Kosovo, UNMIK responded by establishing a Commission to
review the legality of the detentions.116 Nonetheless, without the
authority to issue binding regulations, there is a possibility that
the rights of victims could be superseded by political and public
relations concerns.

suggests that most alleged abuses involve unorganized and indiscriminate violence as opposed to coordinated attacks against the
civilian population. Furthermore, while the Rome Statute criminalizes sexual violence and other crimes alleged to have been
committed by peacekeepers, prosecutions under the Statute tend
to focus on those individuals who order or plan such crimes, as
opposed to the individual perpetrators.97
Additionally, jurisdictional obstacles may prevent the ICC
from exercising jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by
PSO or enforcement operations. First, the ICC operates under
a system of complementarity with national jurisdictions. For
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, the Court must find that the
state is unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes falling within
the jurisdiction of the ICC. Accordingly, much like the international system in place today, the ICC gives primacy to national
jurisdictions to enforce the laws of war on peacekeepers. The
UN generally signs Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with
the national government of the territory where PSO or enforcement forces operate, and these generally govern UN operations.
SOFAs typically preclude national governments from exercising
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by the respective
country’s forces operating within their territory. However many
states, such as the United States, have agreements under Article
98 of the Rome Statute whereby host states may not transfer U.S.
soldiers to ICC jurisdiction.

Ombudspersons
The concept of ombudsperson originated in the domestic
law of several European countries. An ombudsperson may
“receive complaints, investigate and make recommendations to
the relevant authority, but [ombudspersons typically] lack the
authority to enforce the recommendations.”98 The Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) suggested
that international institutions use ombudspersons as a “way to
promote and protect human rights” and IHL.99 There are several examples of the effective use of an ombudsperson within
international organizations. In 1994, the World Bank was the
first organization to establish an ombudsperson within an international organization.100 The United Nations Mission in Kosovo
marked the UN’s first attempt to incorporate an ombudsperson
into a UN mission.

Conclusions and Recommendations
As UN forces have become increasingly active in areas
traditionally reserved for states, allegations of misconduct have
increased. Yet, a lacuna exists in the regulation of UN-sponsored
PSO and peace enforcement forces. The UN must proactively
confront this lack of regulation in order to maintain compliance
with IHL, the spirit of the UN Charter, and the mission of promoting the rule of law.
International state responsibility, national jurisdiction,
human rights mechanisms, the ICC, and claims commissions
will not adequately enforce compliance of IHL by UN forces.
Accordingly, a permanent PSO and peace enforcement ombudsperson should be created to ensure compliance with the law.117
The mandate of the UNMIK ombudsperson allowed wide
discretion to investigate alleged abuse. A permanent ombudsperson must also be free from political influence and able to
compel state and UN compliance with enforceable and binding
decisions.118 This permanent ombudsperson should be given
the authority to promote and protect the rights, freedoms, and
protections provided by IHL of all individuals and legal entities
operating in areas of United Nations peace support and peace
enforcement operations without interference from member
states.
In addition to the ombudsperson, the UN should establish a
permanent claims commission to work with the ombudsperson
to compensate victims. While this commission may be based on
state referral or consent, it would be valuable in ensuring the
rights of victims by establishing clear procedures for referral
by victims if the state government does not have the capacity.

World Bank Ombudsperson
The World Bank incorporated the ombudsperson concept
in the World Bank Inspection Panel.101 The panel provides
“innovative access to international administrative remedies for
non-governmental actors”102 and extends jurisdiction to those
claims “from persons claiming to be affected by a World Bank
project.”103 A party may apply for an inspection if the party
can “demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the
Bank . . . .”104 The inspection panel then reports its finding on
compliance to the Executive Directors;105 however, such decisions are not binding.106

United Nations Mission in Kosovo
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) incorporated an ombudsperson into the international mission.107 Marten
Zwanenburg asserts that the unique status of the UNMIK forces
7
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As UN forces have become increasingly active in areas
traditionally reserved for states, allegations of misconduct
have increased. Yet, a lacuna exists in the regulation of
UN-sponsored PSO and peace enforcement forces. The
UN must proactively confront this lack of regulation in
order to maintain compliance with IHL, the spirit of the
UN Charter, and the mission of promoting the rule of law.
The UN Peacekeeping commission should have “investigative
capacities” like the World Bank Inspection Panel so that it does
not have to rely on only one source of information in evaluating
claims.119 Furthermore, whenever a mission is established, representatives of this commission should be deployed to the host
state to ensure that victims are aware of their right of compensation. The decisions of this commission should be binding on
both the UN and the troop-contributing states so that victims of
abuse are guaranteed redress. This permanent position could be
responsible for all claims against UN PSO and peace enforce-

ment forces and could serve to help increase the credibility of
the UN force amongst the local population and promote the rule
of law.
The UN plays an invaluable role around the world promoting
peace; however, the organization must do more to ensure compliance of its forces with IHL. Such compliance with the laws
of war will limit civilian casualties, help facilitate the transition
to peace, and encourage representative government based on the
rule of law. A permanent ombudsperson and claims commission
could do much to promote this accountability.
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